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Abstract 11 Background
12
Seasonal epidemics of bacterial meningitis in the African Meningitis Belt carry a high burden of 13 disease and mortality. Reactive mass vaccination is used as a control measure during epidemics, but 14 the time taken to gain immunity from the vaccine reduces the flexibility and effectiveness of these 15 campaigns. Highly targeted reactive antibiotic prophylaxis could be used to supplement reactive 16 mass vaccination and further reduce the incidence of meningitis, and the potential effectiveness and 17 efficiency of these strategies should be explored.
18
Methods and Findings

19
Data from an outbreak of meningococcal meningitis in Niger, caused primarily by Neisseria 20 meningitidis serogroup C, is used to estimate clustering of meningitis cases at the household and 21 village level. In addition, reactive antibiotic prophylaxis and reactive vaccination strategies are 22 simulated to estimate their potential effectiveness and efficiency, with a focus on the threshold and 23 spatial unit used to declare an epidemic and initiate the intervention.
24
There is village-level clustering of meningitis cases after an epidemic has been declared in a health 25 area. Meningitis risk among household contacts of a meningitis case is no higher than among 26 members of the same village. Village-wide antibiotic prophylaxis can target secondary cases in 27 villages: across of range of parameters pertaining to how the intervention is performed, up to 200/ 28 672 cases during the season are potentially preventable. On the other hand, household prophylaxis 29 targets very few cases. In general, the village-wide strategy is not very sensitive to the method used 30 to declare an epidemic. Finally, village-wide antibiotic prophylaxis is potentially more efficient than 31 mass vaccination of all individuals at the beginning of the season, and than the equivalent reactive 32 vaccination strategy.
33 Conclusions
34
Village-wide antibiotic prophylaxis should be considered and tested further as a response against 35 outbreaks of meningococcal meningitis in the Meningitis Belt, as a supplement to reactive mass 36 vaccination.
37
Author summary 38 Until a low-cost polyvalent conjugate meningococcal vaccine becomes available in the African 39 Meningitis Belt, reactive strategies to control meningitis epidemics should be considered and tested, 40 and refined in order to maximise effectiveness. A recent cluster-randomised trial conducted in Niger 41 showed promising evidence for the effectiveness of a village-wide reactive antibiotic prophylaxis 42 intervention. We used data from a meningitis outbreak in Niger to explore the potential 43 effectiveness and efficiency of this and other strategies when deployed on a wider scale, allowing us 44 to compare different strategies without recourse to further randomised trials. This study provided 45 further evidence that village-wide antibiotic prophylaxis targets secondary cases in villages, and 46 showed that the intervention remains effective whether it is initiated early in the season (targeting more cases during the season) or later (when clustering of cases by village is strongest). For this 48 outbreak, reactive village-wide antibiotic prophylaxis would have been more potentially efficient 49 than mass vaccination at the beginning of the season, implying that targeted prophylaxis could 50 supplement reactive mass vaccination. Many authors have developed models for vaccination Definitions 127 A N. meningitidis epidemic is defined by whether the weekly attack rate (cases/100,000) has reached 128 a certain threshold(8). The current epidemic threshold used by the WHO is 10 cases/100,000 for any 129 population greater than 30,000, or 5 cases in a week for any population under 30,000. We apply 130 thresholds of 3, 5, 7, and 10 cases/100,000 to three spatial units: health area, commune, and health 131 district, to define whether a region is in an epidemic or not.
132
We are interested in clustering of cases at two spatial units: the household and the village. We 133 define a "contact" of a case as a member of the spatial unit of interest, specifically a household 134 member or resident of the same village. Specifically, an individual is defined as a "contact" of a case 135 if a suspected case has previously occurred in their spatial unit.
136
Clustering measures 137 Clustering at the household and village level is described by calculating two metrics: 
158
The proportion of cases that are contacts of a previously-notified case was calculated, and a 159 confidence interval was estimated using log-binomial regression among cases only, with "having a 160 contact" as the outcome. To assess whether the proportion changes between the non-epidemic and 161 epidemic period, we include it as a variable in the model as described above.
162
Reactive prophylaxis intervention We simulated a variety of prophylaxis strategies on the data, restricted to rural villages only (i.e. 164 those that were not neighborhoods in the cities of Dogondoutchi or Gaya).
165
We simulate the reactive prophylaxis strategy as follows (see Fig 2) . The entire study area starts in 166 the "pre-epidemic" state, in which surveillance for meningococcal meningitis cases is performed at 167 the level of the surveillance unit (health area, commune, or department). When the attack rate has 168 reached a given threshold in a surveillance unit, an epidemic is declared in that unit (as in the middle 169 region in Fig 2) . From this day onwards, the unit enters the "epidemic" state, in which villages in the 
Reactive vaccination 189
Finally, we simulate a reactive vaccination strategy as a comparison for the chemoprophylaxis 190 strategies. As well as simulating the above strategies, we calculate the PPC and number needed to 191 vaccinate (NNV) for a strategy in which mass vaccination of the entire study area is conducted on the 192 day the first case occurs in the season. While this strategy is unrealistic, it represents the best 193 possible strategy in terms of PPC and serves as a basis of comparison for the other interventions.
194 Table 2 shows parameters in the model, meanings, and values considered for simulations. We 195 consider all suspected cases, excluding only cases that tested positive for S. pneumoniae. In effect,
196
we assume that all cases that tested negative for N. meningitidis are in fact false negatives. We 197 perform a sensitivity analysis in which we exclude cases that test negative, and assume that the prophylaxis can prevent cases. The evidence for the effectiveness of prophylaxis is strongest for 202 cases occurring in the two weeks following index case identification (14, 19) . We assume that during 203 the course of the season, no individual can be treated more than once, although we relax this 204 assumption in a sensitivity analysis. In addition, we consider strategies in which only villages below a 205 certain population size are targeted. We make no assumptions about the efficacy of prophylaxis, 206 reporting only the cases that could be targeted within a given time window.
207 Table S1 ).
233
Household prophylaxis 234 The household prophylaxis strategy, under baseline parameter values, would have prevented six surveillance at different spatial units (colors). As the threshold increases the PPC decreases because higher thresholds miss the opportunity to 251 prevent clustered cases before the threshold is passed or in districts that never reach the threshold, 252 while the TNT decreases because the intervention starts later in the season and some regions never 253 pass the higher thresholds. On the other hand, the clustering is stronger later in the season, meaning 254 that contacts of a case are at higher risk of meningococcal meningitis compared to non-contacts 255 later in the season compared to earlier in the season. Therefore, NNT also decreases with threshold 256 (Fig 3) .
257
There are small differences between NNT and PPC across the three surveillance units. When
258
surveillance is performed at the department level, interventions are initiated later in the season 259 when clustering is strongest, so although NNT is lowest when surveillance is performed at the 260 department level using a 10 cases/100,000 threshold, this strategy also prevents fewer cases.
261
Radial prophylaxis strategies 262 Given that spatio-temporal clustering of cases has been shown in previous outbreaks, a prophylaxis 263 strategy targeting multiple villages might be expected to potentially prevent more cases. However, if 264 each village can only be targeted once in the season, a large radius might get "ahead" of the 265 clustering and target villages too early to prevent cases. Whether this happens is determined by a 266 combination of the spatial unit at which the threshold is monitored (health area, commune, or 267 department), the radius of intervention, and the number of days prophylaxis can be expected to 268 protect cases.
269
This logic is borne out in Fig 4, in which TNT, NNT and PPC are shown by radius of the treatment unit, 270 for thresholds of 5, 7, and 10 cases/100,000 applied at the health area level. A radius of 10km 271 around the triggering case increases the PPC relative to the village approach. A higher radius targets 272 villages that experience cases after the prophylaxis window, and the PPC decreases as the radius 273 increases from 10 to 20km. In general, increasing radius leads to increasing TNT, as more villages 274 with no cases are targeted. NNT also increases with radius, as the population-level attack rate is low and only 310 out of 2,588 villages (12%) experience any cases. The above pattern is similar when the 276 threshold is monitored at the commune and department level. 
283
Other more targeted reactive vaccination strategies would have been much less effective at 284 targeting cases due to the lag between case notification and implementation of the vaccination 285 strategy (Fig 5) , and the speed of an epidemic within a single village. when the intervention is initiated. The same strategy implemented with vaccines rather than 293 antibiotics would target fewer than 80 PPC, with NNV exceeding 3,000 vaccines per PPC.
294
Effect of reactive antibiotic prophylaxis across a range of parameters 295 Other parameters relating to how the strategies are implemented affect the success of the 296 intervention (Table 4 ). Excluding cases that tested negative for the presence of N. meningitidis 297 reduces PPC and increases NNT, but the trends in Figs 3 and 4 are unaffected, and the antibiotic 298 prophylaxis strategy remains more efficient than the reactive vaccination strategy. See S1 File for 299 TNT, NNT, and PPC across the full range of parameters explored.
300 household clustering was any stronger before the epidemic threshold was reached, suggesting that 317 the strategy would target a similar number of people during an epidemic.
318
Previous research has focused on the effect of different epidemic thresholds on the effectiveness of 319 reactive mass vaccination. We found that the success of the village-prophylaxis strategy is not 320 strongly dependent on the value of the threshold used, because the threshold is used to initiate a 321 reactive intervention. Performing surveillance at larger spatial units does not markedly improve the 322 success of the village-wide strategy, suggesting that much of the benefit of the village-prophylaxis 323 strategy is gained from the targeting of the villages themselves. Although including multiple villages 324 in a round of prophylaxis can increase the number of cases targeted, the dosing of villages that 325 would have experienced no cases leads to a general increase in NNT for these radial strategies. This 
331
A potential advantage of reactive prophylaxis over reactive mass vaccination is the ability to perform 332 such a strategy within days rather than weeks of the alert threshold being reached. Similarly, the 333 biological effect of antibiotic prophylaxis is immediate, while there is a lag between receiving a 334 vaccination and gaining immunity. In this outbreak, prophylaxis strategies generally perform better 335 than the equivalent reactive vaccination strategies in terms of effectiveness and efficiency because 336 they can be triggered later and thus target more high-risk areas. The best vaccination strategy is one 337 that targets all individuals at the beginning of the season, but such a strategy would be inefficient in 338 a season without a large epidemic. 
362
In analyzing this outbreak, we focused on potentially preventable cases in the absence of a 363 comparator in which an intervention was performed, so our results have limited external 364 comparability with other studies of meningitis outbreaks -specifically, we did not consider 365 incomplete coverage or imperfect efficacy of prophylaxis. In addition, the effect of ciprofloxacin 366 distribution on transmission dynamics of N. meningitidis is not considered, meaning that our 367 estimates may miss some important indirect effects of administering prophylaxis on a large scale.
368
We made a simplifying assumption that prophylaxis prevents any cases that would have occurred 369 during a given time window, but this parameter is unknown. The focus on a single season in which 370 an outbreak did occur limits the generalizability of our results because we did not have access to a 371 "control" season in which there was low burden of meningococcal meningitis. Therefore, 372 conclusions about the benefits of lower thresholds should be considered in this context.
373
The data on which this analysis was based consists of suspected cases reporting to health centres 374 and hospitals in the region. As such, cases that did not present to a health centre but were still 375 preventable are not counted in the analysis. The method for linking case data to census data was not 376 perfect due to missing villages in the census data and villages with different names. As a result, 63 377 cases were excluded from the analysis due to missing or ambiguous village location and population 378 data. Although these two effects lead to underestimation of the effect of village-wide prophylaxis, 379 the trends observed are likely to be robust to missingness unless there is systematic bias in the 380 presence of missingness, for example by time of year.
381
The recent trial of antibiotic prophylaxis in response to a meningitis epidemic showed promising 382 results. Analysis of historical data shows that there is little household clustering of meningitis cases, 383 and that household prophylaxis would have had limited effect on the course of the epidemic, similar 384 to results seen in the trial. On the other hand, there is clustering of meningitis cases at the village 385 level during an epidemic, and a reactive village-prophylaxis strategy conducted in epidemic districts 386 can target secondary cases in villages. Our results also suggest that village-wide prophylaxis is more 387 efficient than highly targeted reactive vaccination. However, the longer-term effectiveness of 388 prophylaxis strategies on their own may be limited, and should thus be considered alongside 389 reactive vaccination.
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